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INTRODUCTION: AN UNWORLDLY CHURCH 
 
In his address in Freiburg of September 25, 2011, Pope Emeritus Benedict 
XVI raised the same question as the one that is the ‘leitmotiv’ of this 
volume, namely, how the Catholic Church, taking for granted that it has 
become a minority in Western Europe, can relate to today’s world of 
seekers in such a way that its message will be heard and followed. In 
particular, Benedict asks whether the Church, in order to realize this goal, 
must “not adapt her offices and structures to the present day, in order to 
reach the searching and doubting people of today.”1 Fundamentally, it 
goes without saying that the Church is called to constant change; in other 
words, it must constantly rededicate itself to its apostolic mission. But for 
Benedict, this mission does not, by any means, coincide with the Church 
becoming worldlier and adapting to the actual world. On the contrary, “in 
order to accomplish her mission, she will need again and again to set 
herself apart from her surroundings, to become in a certain sense 
‘unworldly’.”2 Keeping in mind that Benedict gave his address almost half 
a century after the opening session of the Second Vatican Council, which 
took as its motto the ‘aggiornamento’, that is, the opening up of the 
Church to modern society, his bold answer to this question strikes us. With 
his plea for a detachment of the Church from the world, he clearly 
expresses his opposition against the accommodation strategies in the 
aftermath of Vatican II. But does he go so far as to say that the Church 
should undo again its recent opening up to the world? In order to avoid 
this and other misunderstandings, let us start with investigating what 
Benedict exactly intends with his plea for an ‘unworldly’ Church, and then 
examine how his call relates to the often heard complaint that the Church’s 
detachment from the modern world has brought about a disjunction with 
it. 
                                                          
1 Benedict XVI, Address of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI in Freiburg im 
Breisgau, Sunday, September 25, 2011 (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2011). 
In the plain text, I refer to the Church with the neutral ‘it’, but when quoting Pope 
Emeritus Benedict, I adopt his use of the feminine when referring to the Church. 
2 Ibid. 
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First of all, it has to be noted that, for Benedict, ‘becoming 
unworldly’ (in the German original: Entweltlichung) is a theological 
concept. Thus, it has to be understood in line with the word of the Gospel 
that Christians are indeed in but not of the world.3 From this perspective, 
it is no wonder that he criticizes a Church that has become too much ‘of 
the world’: a worldly “Church becomes self-satisfied, settles down in this 
world, becomes self-sufficient and adapts herself to the standards of the 
world.”4 Hence, by detaching itself from the world, the Church actually 
returns to its original vocation of being the salt of the earth. Therefore, 
paradoxically, Benedict welcomes the secularization process in the 
sociological or juridical sense of the word as a necessary step in order to 
untie the traditional knot between Church and society, thereby referring 
to well-known examples of secularization, such as the expropriation of 
Church goods or elimination of its privileges.5 He qualifies this process 
not as a loss, but rather as a liberation of the Church from all kinds of 
problematic forms of worldliness. 
But the above-quoted passage from the gospel also says that 
Christians are in the world. So, Benedict’s proposal for the Church’s 
detachment from the world should not be misunderstood as a plea for a 
complete withdrawal from it, leading to a fateful separation between the 
Church and the world. On the contrary, if the Church is liberated from its 
material and political burdens and privileges, it is far better equipped to 
fulfill its missionary task: it can reach out more effectively and in a truly 
Christian way to the whole world, and be truly open to it. To phrase it 
paradoxically, insofar as it resolutely moves away from its worldliness, 
that is, from its problematic alliance with the world as it actually is, the 
Church “open[s] up afresh to the cares of the world, to which she herself 
belongs, and give herself over to them.”6 In sum, characteristic of an 
unworldly Church is that it is “not bracketing or ignoring anything from 
the truth of our present situation, but living the faith fully here and now in 
the utterly sober light of day, appropriating it completely, and stripping 
                                                          
3 John, 17:16. In his address, Benedict refers to this passage; see Benedict 
XVI, Address of September 25, 2011. I developed this theme in: Peter Jonkers, 
“In the world, but not of the world. The prospects of Christianity in the modern 
world,” Bijdragen 61 (2000), pp. 370-389. 
4 Benedict XVI, Address of September 25, 2011. 
5 Ibid. Unfortunately, F.-X. Kaufmann interprets the address of Pope 
Emeritus Benedict XVI primarily in this sociological and juridical way, and 
thereby fails to see its theological intention. See Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, 
“Entweltlichte Kirche?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Gegenwart). January 
7, 2012, p. 11. 
6 Benedict XVI, Address of September 25, 2011. 
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away from it anything that only seems to belong to faith, but in truth is 
mere convention or habit.”7 
According to Benedict, the ‘unworldly’ mission of the Church in 
this world “is built first of all upon personal experience: ‘You are 
witnesses’ (Lk 24:48); it finds expression in relationships: ‘Make disciples 
of all nations’ (Mt 28:19); and it spreads a universal message: ‘Preach the 
Gospel to the whole creation’ (Mk 16:15).”8 These keywords – personal 
experience, relationships, and universal message – show that Christian 
faith starts with a personal experience of God, who calls on us to put our 
lives in the sign of the risen Lord, secondly, that this experience is 
expressed in and shared with a community of likeminded people, and, 
finally, that it is preached to the whole world as a message of hope. In 
other words, faith starts with the lived life, which can only thereafter be 
reflected upon theoretically (or theologically) and laid down in doctrines. 
Referring to the title of this paper, Christian faith is not primarily a rational 
doctrine, but an expression of wisdom. 
In a certain sense, Benedict’s plea for an unworldly Church is 
meant to highlight its kenotic character. According to Waclaw 
Hryniewicz, the word ‘kenosis’ means self-limitation, self-resignation. It 
refers to a God, whose liberating love for people is a self-emptying one 
and does not overpower them, to Jesus, who humiliated himself on the 
cross and thereby negated all self-centeredness and self-interestedness, 
and to a vision of the Church that is critical of its ecclesiastical egoisms, 
self-centeredness, and self-satisfaction, or, phrased positively, a Church 
that is more friendly to people, closer to the poor, especially to those who 
have lost hope and meaning in their lives, and open to dialogue with those 
who do not believe.9 Accordingly, Benedict is strongly convinced that 
Christians should let go of all self-centeredness, and that the Church 
should distance itself from its ecclesiastical egoisms and self-satisfaction, 
so that the Church “opens herself to the world not in order to win men for 
an institution with its own claims to power, but in order to lead them to 
themselves by leading them to him of whom each person can say with 
Saint Augustine: he is closer to me than I am to myself.”10 But, on the 
other hand, Benedict’s critique of the modern world is so radical that he 
is often suspected of completely turning his back to it. He despises its 
moral, cultural, and intellectual relativism and its reductionist positivism, 
and is convinced that these ills can only be cured by relying on a trans-
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Waclaw Hryniewicz, The Spirit: The Cry of the World (Washington D.C.: 
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2014), p. ix. 
10 Benedict XVI, Address of September 25, 2011. 
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historical idea of truth and goodness.11 By adopting this position he seems 
to overpower the authentic search for meaning and hope of today’s 
seekers and to overwhelm them with fixed certainties. In the eyes of many, 
this has led to the disjunction that this volume precisely wants to 
overcome: many seekers inside and outside the Church think that it does 
not take their quest for spiritual healing and moral orientation seriously, 
and, hence, that it is not really interested in a dialogue with them.  
Thus, the fundamental question that rises in this respect is whether 
the Church can be unworldly, i.e., refraining from becoming of the world, 
while being at the same time capable of bridging its disjunction with the 
world, i.e., to be truly in the world? Phrased in this way, Benedict’s plea 
for an unworldly Church seems to be as old as the Christian message 
itself: Christ himself has reminded his followers that their true destiny 
does not lay in this world, so they can never feel completely comfortable 
with the world as it is. But Benedict’s critique of the relation between the 
Church and today’s world is more specific and fundamental: he is 
convinced that, in our times, the Church has become too worldly, so that 
it is no longer capable of listening and responding to the existential needs 
of today’s seekers. To put it more concretely, in spite of the line that the 
Church has adopted following the Second Vatican Council, namely, to 
open itself up to the world, it has not really been able to bridge its 
disjunction with the world. This observation is substantiated, at least in 
most Western societies, by the fact that the number of people 
acknowledging that the true destiny of their lives lies in Christian faith 
has been decreasing dramatically. Many others are seeking for meaning 
in rather indiscriminate ways,12 often unaware of what they are seeking, 
but in any case rather loath to what the major religious traditions have on 
offer. But the overall majority does not seek at all, either actively or 
passively, either inside or outside the Church. Against this background, it 
is no wonder that Benedict wants to try another approach, and places his 
bets on a voice that aims to relate to the actual world from a more external 
position. In other words, he thinks that an ‘unworldly’ Church is far better 
able to help seekers find meaning in life and put things in the right 
perspective than a worldly one. But, in spite of all his good intentions, the 
question remains whether his fierce opposition to the modern world will 
                                                          
11 Heiko Nüllmann, Logos Gottes und Logos des Menschen. Der 
Vernunftbegriff Joseph Ratzingers und seine Implikationen für 
Glaubensverantwortung, Moralbegründung und interreligiösen Dialog 
(Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 2012), pp. 305-312. 
12 The indiscriminate character of this search in contemporary society, 
which has been substantiated by a lot of sociological research, has brought me to 
describe it in the introduction to this volume as one of ‘longing without 
belonging’.  
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not result in a Church that is completely out of touch with it so that, 
eventually, its voice will not be heard anymore. Such an outcome would 
not only be counterproductive for the Church, but also, and more 
importantly, be quite the opposite of the very essence of a kenotic Church, 
namely, a Church that is truly in the world, that opens itself up to the cares 
of the world, offering it meaning and hope.  
In sum, Benedict’s plea for an unworldly Church confronts the 
leading question of this volume of how to overcome the disjunction 
between the Church and the world of the seekers, with an intriguing 
paradox: How can the Church remain faithful to its true mission, which is 
fundamentally an unworldly one, while at the same time opening itself up 
in a truthful way to the world, that is, keeping in touch with the spiritual 
needs of people who are seeking meaning and orientation in their lives? It 
is obvious that this paradox cannot be avoided, and even less be solved, 
because it belongs to the essence of Christian faith. Instead, I want to shed 
some light on this paradox by investigating two central ideas from 
Benedict’s address in Freiburg from the perspective of the leading 
question of this volume. 
First, I want to discuss the implications of Benedict’s idea that faith 
has to start from the experience of the lived life, which is then linked to 
the Christian tradition and shared in a community of faith, and preached 
to the whole world. I will show that this comes down to an idea of 
Christian faith as an expression of wisdom, which is able to orientate 
people towards living the good life and prepare them for the eternal life. 
Accepting the idea that Christian faith is first of all an expression of 
wisdom opens a perspective for the Church to bridge its disjunction with 
today’s world by taking to heart the existential quest of the seekers, and 
responding to it by offering elements of Christian wisdom. Phrased 
negatively, such an approach means that the Church distances itself from 
an idea of faith as a set of fixed philosophic-theological certainties. 
Second, and in relation with the first point, I want to examine more 
closely the idea of a kenotic Church, willing to give up its worldly power 
and privileges and to become more humble. Because such a Church aligns 
what it teaches and preaches with its own lived life, thereby admitting that 
Christians have nothing more than their sins to place before God,13 it will 
invite people to live their lives from a Christian perspective rather than 
overwhelm them with its teachings, encourage them to accept the 
Kingdom of God as their ultimate destiny rather than impose a set of 
moral do’s and don’ts. Such a Church is able to let its missionary witness 
shine more brightly and reach out to the whole world, including to non-
believers. Moreover, by recognizing the pivotal importance of its kenotic 
                                                          
13 Benedict XVI, Address of September 25, 2011. 
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character, the Church will also be able to take a more welcoming attitude 
towards other religions in the interreligious dialogue. 
My aim is to examine these two aspects of an unworldly Church 
from a philosophical perspective. In particular, I will ask whether these 
two ideas are indeed capable of overcoming the disjunction between the 
Church and the world of the seekers in a truthful way. Hence, I will leave 
the theological implications of these ideas aside, including Benedict’s 
further development of them.14 In order to clarify the kind of Christian 
wisdom and kenotic Church I am aiming at, I will start with contrasting 
them with two important features of Catholic faith during the second half 
of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, namely, ultramontane mass 
Catholicism and neo-Thomism. Then, I will give a short analysis of the 
world of today’s seekers, focusing on one of its most problematic 
characteristics, viz., the self-centered character of postmodern individuals 
and their lack of truthful life-orientations. In the final section, I will 
examine whether an interpretation of Christian faith in terms of wisdom 
is able to bridge the disjunction between the Church and the world of the 
seekers. 
 
ULTRAMONTANE MASS CATHOLICISM AND  
NEO-THOMISM 
 
Ultramontane Mass Catholicism 
 
The development of the Catholic Church during the second half of the 19th 
and the first half of the 20th century can first of all be characterized as the 
rise of ultramontane mass Catholicism.15 Although it originated in France 
                                                          
14 For an analysis of and critical discussion with Benedict’s ideas on the 
relevance of the Church for contemporary society see Peter Jonkers, “A Purifying 
Force for Reason. Pope Benedict on the Role of Christianity in Advanced 
Modernity,” Towards a New Catholic Church in Advanced Modernity. 
Transformations, Visions, Tensions (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2012), pp. 79-102; and 
Peter Jonkers, “A Philosophical Faith. Pope Benedict’s Response to Rawls,” 
Rawls and Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), forthcoming.  
15 For the coining of this term and its development see Staf Hellemans, “A 
Critical Transition. From Ultramontane Mass Catholicism to Choice 
Catholicism,” The Catholic Church and Modernity in Europe (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 
2009), pp. 37-39; Staf Hellemans, “Tracking the New Shape of the Catholic 
Church in the West,” Towards a New Catholic Church in Advanced Modernity. 
Transformations, Visions, Tensions, pp. 21-23. In the first part of this section, I 
draw extensively from his work on this topic as well as from Wilhelm Damberg, 
“The Catholic Church and European Catholicism after 1945. Moving Towards 
Convergence of Diversity and Fragmentation?,” The Catholic Church and 
Modernity in Europe, pp. 18-21. 
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in the 17th and 18th centuries, this model proved to be especially successful 
in the Low Countries, leading to the so-called compartmentalized or 
pillarized society, which combined societal pluralism with a strong 
homogeneity inside each (religious) compartment. During this period, the 
Church became a highly centralized mass organization, independent of 
the state, oriented towards the Pope in Rome (hence: ultramontane or 
‘beyond the Alps’), and capable of integrating and mobilizing its flock 
massively. The Pope advanced to become the daily leader in Church 
affairs, multiplying his interventions through encyclical letters and other 
statements. Bishops became fully dependent on the Pope’s authority, and 
priests, in turn, on their bishop’s will. As the nation state established a 
standardized structure of government and economy, the Catholic Church 
developed its own internal organization in order to compete with the 
nation state. At the same time, the Church followed the nation states’ 
example with regard to the centralization and standardization of its 
members’ ways of life, so that, in the end, the Catholic Church 
increasingly demonstrated traits which could easily be accorded to a 
‘modern’ state. Catholics were educated to a higher standard by better 
trained priests and nuns, their daily lives were regulated by religious 
obligations from dawn till dusk, they were organized in a host of religious 
associations, and they were mobilized – sometimes in unprecedented 
numbers – in processions and pilgrimages. By the end of the 19th century, 
the ecclesiastical mass organizational model was extended to more secular 
areas: many large Catholic lay organizations were established in the fields 
of education, charity, culture, recreation, and even trade unions and 
political parties. The overall result was the construction of an impressive 
Catholic counter-society, which gave the Church unprecedented power 
and influence, both in strictly religious and more mundane affairs.  
To my mind, in spite of all its merits, ultramontane mass 
Catholicism is an exemplification of a Church that had become – to use 
Benedict’s words – too worldly: it was a Church that was characterized 
by triumphalism and self-centeredness, relying on its traditional 
privileges, on its property, its formal and informal political power and 
influence, and on its use of social pressure, if need be, in order to impose 
its views, laws, and practices on the Catholic pillar of society, and 
sometimes even on society at large. In sum, ultramontane mass 
Catholicism was the opposite of a kenotic Church. The Second Vatican 
Council took the brave decision to distance the Church from this 
ecclesiastical model and to open it up to the modern world in a new way. 
But, as the dwindling numbers of faithful have shown, an evolution that 
started in the 1960s and is still continuing, it failed to reach the modern 
world and to respond to its needs. This obvious lack of success was not so 
much due to the fact that the Church is not yet worldly enough, but 
because it was caught off guard by the consequences of the individualist 
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and expressivist turns, which society has taken since the second half of 
the 20th century, as well as by the impact of the growing plurality of 
individual and collective religious and secular lifestyles on its hierarchical 
structure, on the content of its doctrine, and on the way to convey it to the 
people. Among many other things, these elements have made people loath 
to any authority and hierarchical organization. In this respect, the fate of 
the Catholic Church does not differ from that of governments, political 
parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, etc.  
Since expressive individualism and pluralism profoundly mark the 
lives of the people in all Western societies, the above-mentioned paradox 
of the Church, being in but not of the world, can be further defined: How 
can the Church constructively engage in a dialogue with the seekers and 
their rather vague, eclectic, and mostly implicit ways of life, without 
becoming of the world, that is, identifying so completely with their 
lifestyles that it loses its identity and is no longer appealing anymore, 
because incapable to offer them orientation and meaning? As will be 
shown in the next sections, I think that a kenotic Church is able to respond 
to this paradox appropriately, and, hence, will be able to bridge its 




Ultramontane mass Catholicism went hand-in-hand with a specific way 
in which the Church formulated and substantiated its doctrine, namely, 
neo-Thomism. The main reason for neo-Thomism’s popularity was that it 
proved to be able to answer the specifically modern shape of the question 
of the relation between faith and reason, namely, the rift between faith and 
scientific rationality. Especially since the second half of the 19th century, 
when positivism became more and more popular, this rift became a real 
threat for religion and theology. Positivism claimed that the religious and 
the metaphysical types of explanation, culminating in the arguments for 
God’s existence and the immortality of the soul, were irrational, and had 
to be replaced by a type of explanation that was based only on ‘positive’, 
empirical facts. 
Confronted with this threat, it was no wonder that the Church felt 
an urgent need to keep the progress of positivism in check, especially in 
the light of its growing popularity among the intelligentsia. Hence, it 
looked for a way to prove the fundamentals of Christian faith as 
objectively and scientifically as possible, so that they could stand the 
challenge of positivism. The result was neo-Thomism, which claimed to 
be a return to Thomas Aquinas, who, in his own time, had developed a 
synthesis of faith and reason. However, in comparison to the pre-modern 
theology of Thomas Aquinas, neo-Thomism actually had all the 
characteristics of modern philosophy, resting on the conviction that there 
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was a natural agreement between modern, rationalistic metaphysics and 
Christian faith. The neo-Thomist doctrine of God is an excellent 
illustration of this agreement. It understood God in ontological terms, 
namely, as Being itself, and concluded that Being is the proper name of 
God and that this name designates God’s very essence. This highlights the 
ontotheological character of neo-Thomism: it conjoined the Biblical 
verse, in which God reveals his name, with modern ontology, and gave 
priority to the ontological problem of God’s existence over the religious 
question of his name, and to philosophical argument over religious 
narrative. Another important aspect of neo-Thomism was that it 
substantiated in a rational way the (moral) ends of science and technology, 
and thus presented an alternative to the growing influence of social 
Darwinism on morality. 
With hindsight, neo-Thomism was a well-developed attempt to 
bridge an important aspect of the disjunction between Christian faith and 
the modern world, namely, to adapt the former to modern philosophy and 
the scientific worldview. But, by doing so, it inevitably accepted the 
presuppositions of modern rationality. In particular, its ontological 
approach of God was as rationalistic and foundational as modern science. 
Because of this, neo-Thomism was able to enter into a constructive 
discussion with modern science and, indeed, offered an alternative to 
positivism. But, as we shall see in the fourth section in more detail, the 
flipside of this was that through the dominance of this rationalistic and 
foundational approach, Christian faith became too worldly. In particular, 
it took on too much of the appearance of a closed, quasi scientific system: 
very abstract, involved in metaphysical debates about God’s existence as 
the ultimate foundation of reality, and having definitive and fixed answers 
to people’s existential quests for meaning and hope. Phrased negatively, 
it failed to do justice to the apophatic tradition, which has played a crucial 
role in the Christian tradition of thinking God ever since Pseudo-
Dionysius. Furthermore, it de-contextualized the religious idea of God by 
abstracting from the various practices of faith and their socio-historic and 
existential context: the God of neo-Thomistic philosophy does not 
function and does not have to function in the concrete contexts of personal 
piety or communal worship. Hence, neo-Thomism lost sight of these and 
many other, particularly existential, aspects of Christian faith, e.g., that it 
is first of all an expression of lived wisdom, commending a way of life, 
and embedded in a narrative. In other words, Christian faith is the trusting 
of God’s promise of salvation and orientating one’s life in accordance 
with this trust, not the conclusion of a rational philosophical argument. 
Once that expressive individualism and the ethics of authenticity had 
permeated Western society, it became clear that Christian faith was 
dramatically lacking the dialogical and kenotic attitude, which is 
imperative to relate its wisdom tradition to the existential quest of today’s 
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individuals. So, a second aspect of the Church’s response to the paradox 
of being in the world, i.e., overcoming its disjunction with the world of 
the seekers, without becoming of the world, i.e., getting totally absorbed 
in the expressive individualist mood and its lack of a larger perspective, 
consists in making the transition from a doctrinal, in particular neo-
Thomist, to an existential, in particular wisdom-orientated, approach of 
Christian faith, and show the seekers that it offers hope and meaning to 
their lives.  
 
THE SEEKERS AND THEIR CONTINGENT LIFESTYLES AND 
NARRATIVES 
 
Before giving two examples of how the (Catholic) Church can bridge its 
disjunction with the seekers, I first want to present a short outline of the 
world in which they are living, especially with regard to their basic 
attitude towards the variety of lifestyles, Christian and secular. As a 
consequence of the deepening impact of expressive individualism on all 
Western societies since the 1960s, the compartmentalized society with its 
strong, hierarchical subsocieties has collapsed. As said, this process not 
only affected the (Catholic) Church, but all major societal organizations 
and even the state itself. The overall result is a society consisting of 
individualized individuals, who are embedded in multicultural and 
globalizing networks, gathering from time to time in smaller or larger 
groups around specific issues, one of which is religion. People who feel 
attracted to religion can, thanks to the rise of new institutional religions, 
the ubiquity of religious books and the internet, and the growing 
popularity of the tourist and legacy industries, opt for a wide variety in 
religious offerings inside as well as outside the traditional churches. 
Moreover, the predicament of choice cannot be reduced to a couple of 
‘big’ choices to which one remains loyal throughout one’s life. On the 
contrary, choice has become a never-ending process of muddling through 
a panoply of small choices, and keeping one’s involvements and loyalties 
under the constant check of new choices.16 
The above explains the rise of a plurality of (religious) lifestyles 
and their underpinning narratives, which characterizes the world of 
today’s seekers. Moreover, this plurality goes hand-in-hand with the 
conviction that all lifestyles are nothing but contingent social 
constructions of reality, lacking a reasonable ground, only being chosen 
on the basis of the subjective feeling of their attractiveness, permanently 
open to reconsideration, and offering raw material for endless re-
                                                          
16 Hellemans, “Tracking the New Shape of the Catholic Church in the 
West,” pp. 24-26. 
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descriptions.17 Rorty, who has given a philosophical underpinning of this 
view, calls these lifestyles and narratives ‘final vocabularies’, which can 
only be substantiated by circular arguments whose strength does not reach 
beyond the persons or communities using them. Confronted with this 
situation, the seekers, especially the active ones, run the risk of becoming 
ironic, that is, “never quite able to take themselves seriously because [they 
are] always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are 
subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their 
final vocabularies [i.e., the narratives underpinning their lifestyles], and 
thus of their selves.”18 They put this into practice by continually re-
describing themselves, society, and the world in ever new ways, by 
constantly re-creating themselves without referring to any normative 
eternal examples, like God, the Absolute, reason, truth, etc. In other 
words, they are constantly inclined to give up one vocabulary in favor of 
another, but never find peace in any of them. Consequently, they run the 
risk of not belonging to anything anymore, of completely losing their 
identity. 
Rorty suggests a pragmatic way of dealing with this predicament, 
namely, to devote oneself to the vocabulary one is familiar with and, 
consequently, simply declare that there are limits to what one can take 
seriously. Many seekers opt for this pragmatic attitude: for the time being, 
they are committed to a (religious) lifestyle and take its underpinning 
narrative for granted, although they are at the same time aware that their 
attachment is completely contingent and that its underpinning narrative is 
circular; they believe in it only because they happen to be a member of 
this specific club and feel attracted to it for personal reasons. However, in 
order to work in today’s pluralist society, in which a common ground is 
almost completely lacking, especially when it comes to the day-to-day 
do’s and don’ts, their partisanship for a specific vocabulary has to remain 
confined to the private sphere, while in public they are expected to take a 
completely neutral attitude in order to safeguard peaceful co-existence.  
It is obvious that this pragmatic attitude, which is not only taken by 
most seekers (active and passive ones), but is paradigmatic for our 
postmodern condition as such, poses fundamental problems. To start with, 
many of our substantial attachments, such as the kind of food we prefer, 
our morning or evening rituals, and even our native language, are indeed 
contingent matters, so that any claim to their truth makes no sense and is 
                                                          
17 I developed this further in Peter Jonkers, “Contingent Religions, 
Contingent Truths?” Religions Challenged by Contingency. Theological and 
Philosophical Perspectives to the Problem of Contingency (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
pp. 167-170, and in Jonkers, “A Purifying Force For Reason,” pp. 82-85. 
18 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 73f. 
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sometimes even inappropriate. But does this reasoning hold for our 
substantial commitments to (religious or secular) ways of life as well, 
which define our identity on a practical level? Are these commitments 
nothing but the expression of our personal attachment to a contingent 
lifestyle? If this were the case, people should not find any difficulties in 
performing a sort of ‘mental acrobatics’, namely, to be substantially 
committed in the private domain to their ways of life while, at the same 
time, recognizing their sheer contingency in the public domain. This 
quandary between private and public life becomes even more acute when 
religious people, who are convinced of the truth of their faith, enter the 
public domain in which, according to this postmodern paradigm, everyone 
is expected to take a completely neutral attitude: Are they really prepared 
to sing their religious song in the choir of the public debate under the 
condition that they keep their mouths shut? 
Actually, I don’t think that humans are capable of performing such 
mental acrobatics, or that they are prepared to keep quiet in the public 
debate, nor should they. In contexts of both religious and secular ways of 
life people use words like ‘authentic’, ‘true’, and ‘universal’ in order to 
express something that not only counts for themselves or a small group of 
like-minded peers, but deserves to be recognized publicly. Obviously, the 
striving for public recognition of diverging ways of life often appears to 
be a painful confrontation of irreconcilable practices. Nevertheless, this 
striving shows that there is something essential at stake: others ask us to 
recognize that their ways of life are authentic attempts to realize 
fundamental human values, although we may completely disagree with 
them. In other words, the striving for public recognition of ways of life 
can only take place against the background of conflicting substantial 
meanings, because only then all partners in this process realize that there 
is something essential at stake. Therefore, we feel deeply frustrated when 
others don’t take these meanings seriously, and reduce them to contingent, 
private opinions whose acceptance does not rest upon their substance, but 
merely upon one’s subjective right to lead one’s own life, and on their not 
causing too much of a fuss. 
What matters to me here is the fact that, in our striving for public 
recognition, we reach out towards something essential, towards an 
existential truth which is beyond our subjective, contingent self. In the 
end, we don’t want to be left alone with our contingent convictions and 
practices, nor are we prepared to leave others alone with theirs. We 
humans are too finite to be left alone with our own finitude, too dependent 
on the recognition of our substantial meanings by others to seriously 
consider ourselves as the only creators of truth and meaning in a 
meaningless world. This implies that the ‘mental acrobatics’ that is 
required to be a full member of the postmodern circus of life-styles, 
bidding for the public’s favor, falls short of expectations. We cannot live 
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with the idea that all our substantial attachments, which are essential for 
our identity, are, in the public domain, completely contingent. In many 
cases, we make use – at least implicitly – of notions like authenticity and 
truth, and by doing so, we claim that these commitments transcend the 
level of contingent social constructions. 
It has to be noted that this argument should not be understood as a 
plea for exclusive recognition, which leads to opposing one religious or 
secular way of life to all the others. On the contrary, democratic societies 
can only exist by the grace of a plurality of religions and philosophies of 
life. But, in any case, the fact that people are so anxious to have their 
(religious or secular) ways of life publicly recognized, and are prepared 
to discuss them fiercely in the public debate, raises these traditions above 
the level of sheer contingency. With regard to the prime concern of this 
paper of how to overcome the disjunction between the Church and the 
seekers, the fact that so many people are caught nowadays in the paradox 
of being convinced of the contingency of their ways of life, while at the 
same time striving for an authentic and truthful orientation in life, offers 
a fruitful prospect for the Church: from a kenotic redefinition of its 
mission in the world, it can offer to today’s seekers such an orientation 
without overwhelming their quest for meaning and hope with fixed, pre-
given answers. It can do so by focusing on faith as a tradition of wisdom, 
as I will develop in more detail in the next section.  
 
CHRISTIAN WISDOM AS A RESPONSE TO THE SEEKERS 
 
The previous sections have made clear the paradoxical situation of the 
seekers as well as the main reasons why it has been so difficult for the 
Church to bridge its disjunction with them. They are caught between their 
gut feeling that all religions are but contingent social constructions and 
their need for an authentic and truthful orientation in life. The Church, for 
its part, has not yet been able, after the collapse of ultramontane mass 
Catholicism and rationalist neo-Thomism, to respond to the challenges of 
the increase of individual lifestyles and the radical plurality of 
worldviews. But the previous sections also resulted in two positive 
suggestions about how the Church can respond positively to the paradox 
that constitutes its essence, namely, to be in but not of the world: through 
its tradition of wisdom, it can offer the seekers concrete examples of 
truthful life-orientations, and thus bridge its disjunction with them, while 
at the same time holding on to the transcendent character of this 
orientation, without which it would lose its identity. First, it needs to 
engage in a constructive dialogue with the individualized lifestyles of the 
seekers and with the plurality of worldviews. Second, in order to be able 
to do so, the Church should take a modest and even kenotic stance. This 
enables it to present Christian faith as an authentic and truthful way of 
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life, and offer it to the seekers as a response to their searching, but without 
overwhelming them with fixed, pre-given answers.19 These two 
suggestions can be seen as exemplifications of a longstanding tradition in 
Christianity, namely, that of Christian wisdom. In what follows, I will 
develop in more detail the idea of Christian wisdom in a pluralistic world, 
and explore whether it contributes to bridging the disjunction of the 
Church with the seekers. 
In the introduction of his book on Christian wisdom, David Ford 
notes that wisdom may be making a comeback, after being associated for 
a long time with old people, tradition, and conservative caution in a 
culture of youth, modernization, innovation, and risky exploration. The 
revival of wisdom is especially evident in areas where knowledge and 
(technical) know-how come up against questions of ethics, values, beauty, 
the shaping and flourishing of the whole person, the common good, and 
long-term perspectives.20 Any wisdom needs to take seriously the desire 
for some sense of overall meaning and connectedness, and also for 
guidance in discernment in specific situations.21 This means that wisdom 
requires an objective as well as a subjective integration or connectedness, 
and, hence, has an aspect of theoretical learning as well as practical virtue: 
someone who has a vast knowledge about moral subjects, but who lives 
foolishly himself, would not be termed wise.22 In Christianity, the Books 
of Wisdom and the sayings of Jesus, as well as the life stories of people 
who live by them, are concrete examples of wisdom. But, through literary 
works and other forms of art, as well as through the lives of secular heroes, 
secular world-views are treasuries of wisdom too. The focus of Ford’s 
book is to uncover Christian wisdom through an approach that can be 
summarized as “‘scriptural-expressivist’ in its concern to draw from 
                                                          
19 Of course, this suggestion does not imply at all that (dogmatic) theology 
would become obsolete. On the contrary, since Christian faith cannot be reduced 
to just a way of life, in other words, to a contingent lifestyle, but has always 
presented itself as a truthful way of life, theology has to examine these truth 
claims critically.  
20 David Ford, Christian Wisdom. Desiring God and Learning in Love 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 1. 
21 See John Kekes, “Wisdom,” American Philosophical Quarterly 20, 3 
(1983), pp. 277-286. 
22 Robert Nozick, The Examined Life. Philosophical Meditations (New 
York: Touchstone Press, 1989), p. 273. Several authors deplore the fact that, since 
modernity, the tension between theoretical, detached knowledge and life-
oriented, engaged love has widened to a complete rift, which has obviously gone 
at the cost of the more holistic idea of wisdom. See: Ford, Christian Wisdom, pp. 
269-271; Brenda Almond, “Seeking Wisdom,” Philosophy 72, 281 (1997), pp. 
423-428; Daniel Kaufman, “Knowledge, Wisdom, and the Philosopher,” 
Philosophy 81, 1 (2006), pp. 129-151. 
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reading scripture a lively idiom of Christian wisdom today, one that forms 
its expression in sustained engagement with scripture’s testimony to God 
and God’s purposes amidst the cries of the world.”23 
It is not my intention in this section to give a summary of Ford’s 
book, since it mainly draws concrete ideas and practices of wisdom from 
the Bible, while this paper has a philosophical focus. Rather, I will 
develop two important examples of Christian wisdom, which Ford 
discusses in his book, namely, thinking biblically and scriptural 
reasoning. In particular, I will give a theoretical account of how they can 
contribute to present Christian faith as an authentic and truthful way of 
life, which is able to engage in a constructive dialogue with the world of 
the seekers. In order to do so, I will develop Ford’s ideas on the basis of 
the research that has been done by Paul Ricoeur on linking the 
philosophic-theological thinking of God to wisdom, and by Nicolas 
Adams’ research on the role of religion in the public debate in a pluralist 
society.24 
It goes without saying that, besides these two examples of Christian 
wisdom, a lot of others could be given, theoretical as well as practical 
ones. A practical example that has made quite an impression on me is the 
charitable work of the Community of San Egidio.25 First of all, this 
community is one of the best illustrations of what it means to be a kenotic 
Church. On the basis of a profound Christian spirituality its members offer 
concrete (material) help to those who are in need, especially to people 
who, although living in Western societies, are not covered by social 
security. Through their practical commitment to the underclass, they also 
exemplify a form of practical Christian wisdom in today’s predominantly 
secular society: for the members of San Egidio, the deep motivation, 
which enables them to give hope to the needy and, above all, to persevere 
even in times of adversity, does not result from a contingent way of life, 
but stems directly from their faith in the truth of the Christian message as 
source of inspiration and hope for their own lives as well as for all other 
people, especially for the lives of the needy. The practical wisdom 
expressed in this example is the following: the more your path of life takes 
you in the direction of charitable work, the more you need an 
underpinning that lets you experience that what you do not only matters 
to others, but also to God, that is, transcendentally. In other words, what 
                                                          
23 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p. 3. 
24 Nicolas Adams, Habermas and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); André LaCoque and Paul Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically. 
Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
25 For more information on San Egidio, see: http://www.santegidio.org/pa- 
geID/2/langID/en/THE_COMMUNITY.html. 
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you do really matters and thus gives you joy, even if the deprived people 
you work for do not (always) seem to be grateful, and even if you may not 




Through his approach to the Bible that he has coined ‘thinking biblically’, 
Paul Ricoeur presents an alternative to neo-Thomism’s predominantly 
rationalistic approach of God’s existence and its inability to respond to 
the existential questions of today’s seekers. Ford reads Ricoeur’s attempt, 
especially his rereading of Exodus 3:14, as a contribution of prophetic 
wisdom:  
 
The wisdom is in the way he [Ricoeur] differentiates, 
interrelates and rebalances several pairs of elements: Exodus 
3:14 in its original language and context in conjunction with 
theology; theology with philosophy; Judaism with 
Christianity; Old Testament with New Testament; 
Christianity with Western culture. All this is in the service of 
rethinking God in such a way as simultaneously to do justice 
to past thought and worship, to address current issues 
prophetically, and to open the tradition up to yet further 
development: in short, the intellectual dimension of learning 
to live in the Spirit today.26 
 
Before examining Ricoeur’s wisdom-orientated thinking of God’s 
existence on the basis of Exodus 3:14, let us first take a closer look at his 
nuanced assessment of the broad and tumultuous conceptual history that 
“consisted in conjoining God and Being, and whose impact lasted for over 
fifteen hundred years.”27 First of all, the translation of the original Hebrew 
text of Exodus 3:14 into Greek and then Latin was a major event in 
thinking because it linked the original text in an enduring manner to a 
metaphysical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle and continuing 
until the present day. Thus, this translation contributed in a decisive way 
to the intellectual and spiritual identity of the Christian West.28 But this 
long tradition of conjoining God and Being did not bring any of the 
Church fathers and the great Scholastics to confuse God’s direct revelation 
                                                          
26 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p. 217. 
27 Paul Ricoeur, “From Interpretation to Translation,” Thinking Biblically, 
p. 356. 
28 Therefore, it would be naïve to think that exegesis could coincide, without 
the mediation of a tradition of reading, with the original signification of the text 
of Exodus, even with the presumed intention of its author. Cfr. Ibid., p. 332. 
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in Exodus 3:14 with a philosophical speculation about Being, or to think 
that this speculation would reveal to human reason the mystery of the 
divine essence in the intimacy of its innermost nature. Phrased positively, 
all of them considered the delicate balance between the apophatic 
tradition, according to which we cannot affirm anything about God, and 
the tradition of analogy, which holds that Being can be spoken of in 
affirmative statements, as the frame of reference in their thinking about 
God. “Apophatism and ontology thus ran along together side by side.”29 
However, modern philosophy, and neo-Thomism in particular, 
upset this delicate balance. Ricoeur shows this by giving a critical analysis 
of what Gilson called the ‘metaphysics of Exodus’, according to which 
“Exodus lays down the principle from which Christian philosophy will be 
suspended.”30 This illustrates Gilson’s claim that philosophy, in particular 
(neo-Thomist) ontology, naturally agrees with Christian faith. Neo-
Thomism’s stress on the natural character of this agreement is 
substantiated by the fact that it attached a far greater importance to the 
proofs of God’s existence than Thomas Aquinas himself had done, and 
consequently, not only claimed to know that God is, but also what he is. 
This shows that neo-Thomism failed to do justice to the apophatic 
tradition that had been dear to Aquinas.31  
In contrast to contemporary post-metaphysical philosophers like 
Heidegger, Levinas, and Marion, who think that the statement that Being 
is the proper name of God and that this name designates God’s very 
essence is an aberration,32 Ricoeur takes a more nuanced position in this 
debate: he admits that “the rapprochement between the God of the 
Scriptures and the Being of the philosophers remains historically 
contingent and speculatively fragile.”33 It is contingent because nothing in 
Greek thought pointed to a fusion of God and Being. Moreover, this 
rapprochement is also speculatively fragile because the difference 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p. 342. 
30 See: Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (Gifford lectures 
1931-1932) (London: Sheed and Ward, 1936), p. 51. Quoted in: Ricoeur, “From 
Interpretation to Translation,” p. 353. 
31 Ricoeur notes, however, that in the Summa “the first question posed 
concerning God shifts attention to the ‘existential’ aspect of esse, as though the 
question of existence takes priority over that of the name.” See Ibid., p. 352. 
32 Peter Jonkers, “God in France: Heidegger’s Legacy,” God in France. 
Eight Contemporary French Thinkers on God (Leuven, Paris, Dudley MA: 
Peeters, 2005), pp. 1-42 ; Ricoeur, “From Interpretation to Translation,” pp. 355-
359. 
33 Ibid., p. 353. Ricoeur notes that Gilson, shortly before his death in 1978, 
admitted the contingency and fragility of this conjunction, although he still 
supported it almost half a century before. This shift in Gilson’s position is a clear 
illustration of neo-Thomism’s declining plausibility. 
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between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and 
Jacob (Pascal) remains insurmountable. The overall result is that “we find 
ourselves confronted with the nonphilosophical origin of God and his 
nonnecessity for philosophy.”34 This implies that the event in thinking that 
has brought about the rapprochement between God and Being can, and 
should, according to many contemporary philosophers and theologians, 
be made undone as a consequence of a shift from its being plausible to its 
being suspect. Ricoeur, for his part, draws another conclusion. He accepts 
this rapprochement, in spite of its contingent and fragile character, as a 
historical fact that has shaped the intellectual and spiritual identity of the 
Christian West. Hence, it cannot, and should not, simply be rejected, but 
needs to be reinterpreted. In Ricoeur’s view, it is crucial for Christian faith 
that the philosophical communicability of the ‘wisdom for God’ is 
restored, which requires that the break between Exodus 3:14 and 
philosophical reason is reconsidered. Only then can the sapiential point of 
this Bible verse and, more in general, its significance for Western culture 
be preserved. Hence, he asks: “Why not assume that Exodus 3:14 was 
ready from the very beginning to add a new region of significance to the 
rich polysemy of the verb being, explored in other terms by the Greeks 
and their Muslim, Jewish and Christian heirs.”35 
In order to uncover the sapiential dimension of Exodus 3:14, 
Ricoeur starts with formulating some working hypotheses. The first one 
is that great religious texts express modes of thought that differ from 
philosophy and cannot be reduced to it, but nevertheless give rise to 
philosophical thinking. These texts belong to a kind of discourse that is 
not scientifically descriptive or explanatory, or even apologetic, 
argumentative, or dogmatic, but whose metaphorical language expresses 
profound wisdom.36 With this hypothesis, Ricoeur not only takes distance 
from neo-Thomism’s natural agreement between metaphysics and 
Christian faith, but also from the post-metaphysical idea that the equation 
of God and Being is an intellectual aberration. Instead, he encourages us 
to think in a sapiential way the revelation of God’s name in relation to the 
verb Being. 
A second working hypothesis concerns the relation between the 
Scriptures and the historical communities of reading and interpretation. A 
hermeneutical circle imposes itself here: in interpreting its Scriptures, the 
community in question interprets itself. A mutual election takes place here 
between those texts taken as foundational and the community that is 
founded by them. But this relation is also characterized by a fundamental 
asymmetry: the founding text teaches and the community receives 
                                                          
34 Ibid., p. 354. 
35 Ibid., p. 341; see also p. 360. 
36 André LaCoque and Paul Ricoeur, “Preface,” Thinking Biblically, p. xvi. 
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instruction, which implies that, in this regard, faith is nothing other than 
the confession of this asymmetry. Readers and interpreters don’t have to 
share the faith of this community, but if they want to enter this 
hermeneutical circle, they have to participate at least by way of 
imagination and sympathy in the act of adhesion by which the historical 
community recognizes itself as founded and comprised in and by this 
particular body of texts.37  
Which, then, are the essential elements of a wisdom-oriented 
interpretation of Exodus 3:14, and in what sense do they differ from the 
traditional ontological or ontotheological interpretation? First of all, 
keeping in mind the polysemy of the verb ‘Being’, we should guard 
against any ontological abstraction, or, more generally speaking, against 
any claim to intellectual mastery regarding this verb.38 God’s self-
presentation and the complementary recognition of his ‘being’ by the 
faithful form an asymmetrical pair in which the one who presents himself 
holds the initiative, whereas the recognition implies a ‘responsive’ 
attitude. As tributaries of the apophatic tradition, medieval thinkers have 
heeded this warning against an (intellectual) appropriation of God’s name 
far more than modern philosophy, including neo-Thomism.  
Guarding the interpretation of Exodus 3:14 from ontological 
abstraction means, first of all, giving priority to Christian faith as a 
tradition of wisdom. But because this priority does not mean to sever the 
relation between faith and reason, it is legitimate to reflect on Christian 
wisdom philosophically in order to make it understandable to others. The 
idea that the metaphorical language of great religious texts expresses 
profound wisdom connects the narrative and the reflective dimension of 
religion. Thus, not only does it contribute to bridging the well-known 
opposition between the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the God of 
the philosophers and scientists, but it can also bridge the disjunction 
between the longstanding reflective tradition of Christian faith and the 
world of the seekers, which is dominated by narratives of all kinds. In 
order to engage in a constructive dialogue with the seekers, faith should 
be first communicated through the Christian narrative and the wisdom that 
is embedded in it. Because this narrative is connected to a reflective 
tradition, it is possible to think it philosophically and rephrase this 
narrative in a more conceptual way so that it, finally, can be linked to the 
existential questions of today’s seekers, inside and outside the Church, 
and gives them food for thought. Taken together, these three steps 
exemplify Christian wisdom as a hermeneutical process, which can be 
offered as an authentic and truthful orientation to the seekers who are 
willing to enter this hermeneutical circle themselves. 
                                                          
37 Ibid., p. xvi f. 
38 Ricoeur, “From Interpretation to Translation,” p. 335. 
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This hermeneutical space, which is opened by the insight that God’s 
self-revelation always transcends its recognition and conceptualization by 
humans, shows a further aspect of Christian wisdom: no instance, 
including the Church, may use his name in vain, e.g., by appropriating it, 
or reducing it to a set of fixed doctrinal formulas. In other words, fulfilling 
the commandment to do God’s will does not reduce humans to spiritual 
automates, but encourages them to seek what letting their lives be oriented 
by God offers them and requires from them in a concrete situation. 
Especially in our times of radical lifestyle pluralism, every claim to 
infallible truth on doctrinal grounds is met with suspicion. In order to 
convince people of the existential truth of Christian faith, the idea of 
Christian wisdom as offering an authentic and truthful ‘orientation in life’ 
is far more appealing, especially to the seekers. 
In order to further explain the hermeneutical nature of our 
orientation in existential matters, and hence of wisdom, I refer to Kant’s 
essay on orientation.39 Every kind of orientation requires a subjective 
principle: to orientate oneself in moral, or more generally speaking, 
existential matters means “to be guided, in one’s conviction of truth, by a 
subjective principle of reason where objective principles of reason are 
inadequate.”40 This is so because we feel, on the one hand, an urgent 
(subjective) need to pass a true judgment about our life-orientations, 
while, on the other hand, we are painfully aware of the lack of objective 
knowledge that would make such a judgment univocally and universally 
true. In other words, to orientate oneself in moral matters is neither a 
matter of just doing whatever come to one’s mind nor of objective science. 
So, the hermeneutical nature of wisdom lies in the fact that it is situated 
between doctrinal dogmatism and a contingent opinion.41 This means that 
the idea of Christian wisdom can be offered to the seekers as a plausible 
way out from their predicament of being caught between their gut feeling 
that all religions are contingent social constructions and their need for an 
authentic and truthful orientation in life. 
Finally, “it seems reasonable to take the formula in Exodus 3:14 as 
an emphatic expansion of the self-presentation of God,” thereby creating 
“an exceptional hermeneutical situation, namely the opening to a plurality 
of interpretations of the verb [being] used here.”42 This plurality ranges 
                                                          
39 Immanuel Kant, “Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren,” Werke in zehn 
Bänden. Band 5: Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), pp. 267-283. 
40 Ibid., p. 270, footnote. 
41 For an analysis of the implications of Kant’s idea of orientation in 
existential matters for philosophy of religion, see Peter Jonkers, “Redefining 
Religious Truth as a Challenge for Philosophy of Religion,” European Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2012): 139-159. 
42 Ricoeur, “From Interpretation to Translation,” p. 336, 337. 
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from the evocation of the personal God of Israel to the manifold meanings 
of the notion of Being. It is essential to keep this plurality in mind; it 
means that the revelation of God’s name belongs to a different order than 
a speculation on Being, although these two orders have been conjoined 
since the beginning of Christianity. Hence, the ontological speculation 
about the neuter Being should not obliterate the theological reflection 
about the first person expression of God’s name. From the perspective of 
Christian wisdom, this means that God remains first of all someone to 
whom we can pray, and someone whom we believe hears our prayers. In 
order to do justice to this idea, a paraphrasitic translation of Exodus 3:14 
is needed. In this context, Ricoeur refers to the one proposed by the 
modern Jewish thinker Franz Rosenzweig, for whom this paraphrase 
serves to underscore the shift from the neuter to the first person and, thus, 
from theoretical speculation to Christian wisdom.43 Rosenzweig’s 
translation does not identify God with eternal Being, or even with the 
existent, but with the existing (der Daseiende), present to the Dasein of 
human beings. Such a paraphrasitic translation of Exodus 3:14 does “not 
convey a complete break with the verb Sein, but rather another extension 
of its polysemy.”44 But, at the same time, underscoring God as a person 
and, thus, closely relating him to the lives of human beings, highlights the 
sapiential dimension of Christian faith and offers the seekers of our times 




Given the pluralist character of contemporary society and the experienced 
contingency of all its religions and secular worldviews, a second way in 
which the Church can open itself up to the world of the seekers is through 
a positive engagement with their religious and secular lifestyles, but 
without having to give up the sacredness of its scriptures or having to 
translate them into the language of secular reason. Ford proposes 
scriptural reasoning, understood as a wisdom-seeking engagement with 
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scriptures, as a concrete way to realize such 
a dialogue.45 Historically speaking, the reading of sacred scriptures has 
been overwhelmingly an intra-traditional affair, and scriptural reasoning, 
which is by definition inter-traditional, has been hardly encouraged by the 
                                                          
43 Ibid., p. 360f. As a translation of Exodus 3:14, Rosenzweig suggests: “Ich 
werde dasein, als der ich dasein werde…ICH BIN DA schickt mich zu euch.“ 
44 Ibid., p. 361. 
45 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p. 273. It has to be noted that scriptural 
reasoning refrains from theorizing its own bases, but consists of the practice of 
scriptural reasoning. For a description of this practice see: Ibid., pp. 275-278, and 
Adams, Habermas and Theology, pp. 239-243. 
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particular traditions of the participants. Therefore, engaging in such a 
reasoning requires, from a Catholic perspective, that the Church must take 
leave from the triumphalism and self-centeredness that characterized 
ultramontane mass Catholicism and become kenotic again; obviously, the 
same holds true for the participants from other religious traditions. This 
means that all of them have to “acknowledge the sacredness of the others’ 
scriptures to them (without having to acknowledge its authority for 
oneself),” as well as acknowledge that “they do not exclusively own their 
scriptures – they are not experts on its final meaning.”46 However, if 
scriptural reasoning is meant to be relevant to the vast world of the 
seekers, most of whom only marginally or do not at all belong to one of 
the established religious traditions, it has to be extended to secular 
worldviews, as I will show at the end of this section.  
Scriptural reasoning starts with recognizing that each tradition’s 
scripture is at the heart of its identity, because scriptures are formative for 
understanding God and God’s purposes, for prayer, worship and liturgy, 
for normative teaching, for imagination and ethos, etc. Sacred scriptures 
contain also long chains of reasoning, argumentation, and conclusions, 
where communal identities are expressed at a profound level. So, 
scriptural reasoning prevents these traditions from being treated as 
contingent social constructions. In order to show how these chains of deep 
reasoning can orientate the lives of people today they have to be made 
public. Scriptural reasoning fulfils this task by bringing together the 
interpretation of sacred scriptures, the practices of philosophical and 
theological reasoning, and ‘public issue’ questions.47 But, as is common 
knowledge, each of these scriptures can also be used to frame the identity 
of a tradition in a problematic way, e.g., by opposing it to other identities, 
legitimatizing violence, claiming superiority, pronouncing blanket 
condemnations, etc.48 This refers to the pitfall of one (religious) tradition 
striving for exclusive recognition, as pointed out in the third section of 
this paper. In order to avoid this and other pitfalls, scriptural reasoning 
acknowledges the sacredness of these scriptures to the members of each 
tradition, but without acknowledging their authority to others. The result 
is that scriptural reasoning is polyphonic and cannot be reduced to an 
authoritarian monologue of one tradition, distorting all the other ones. 
But the need to avoid the pitfall of a monological distortion of other 
traditions does not only concern religions, but also secular worldviews. 
The separation of state and church, which characterizes all democratic 
                                                          
46 Ford, Christian Wisdom, pp. 279f. See also Adams, Habermas and 
Theology, p. 243. 
47 Ford, Christian Wisdom, pp. 277, 279; Adams, Habermas and Theology, 
p. 242. 
48 Ford, Christian Wisdom, p. 274. 
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societies, does not mean that religious deep reasonings may be put on the 
procrustean bed of secular rationality; nor can the acceptability of these 
reasonings in politics, let alone in the public debate, be judged by the 
standards of this rationality. In other words, in order to keep democratic 
society truly polyphonic, it is essential to realize that the separation of 
state and church cannot be used as a pretext to exclude religious 
convictions from the public debate, and even less that secular liberalism 
is the only acceptable philosophy of life.49 In sum, as I have shown in the 
previous section, the recognition of the sacredness of the Scriptures to a 
community that is founded by them does not require secular people to 
acknowledge the authority of these scriptures for themselves. But when 
these people enter the hermeneutical circle of the public debate, they are 
required to accept the idea that Christian faith expresses a kind wisdom 
that can be interpreted philosophically, and, hence, offers food for thought 
to them. This philosophical interpretation of Christian wisdom serves as 
a common ground for secular and religious people. 
The above shows that scriptural reasoning can mediate between the 
sacred scriptures of different religions, as well as between religions and 
secular worldviews. It realizes this aim by making deep (religious) 
reasonings public so that others, religious as well as secular people, may 
learn to understand them and discover why particular trains of reasoning 
are reasonings, and not just particular assumptions, contingent social 
constructions, and why they are attractive or problematic.50 In other 
words, scriptural reasoning enables religious and secular traditions to be 
recognized by people who do not belong to this specific tradition, but 
without having to accept any claim for exclusive recognition. It is able to 
fulfill this task because it is a manifestation of religious wisdom, which is 
the fruit of a much broader kind of rationality than, say, the rationalistic, 
foundational kind of rationality of neo-Thomism. As pointed out above, 
wisdom, including Christian wisdom, is embedded in the sacred scriptures 
of religious traditions and in the key texts of secular traditions, all of them 
trying to respond to the existential questions and needs of people. 
Hence, scriptural reasoning is able to understand deep religious and 
secular reasonings in their own right. They aim at establishing a 
hermeneutical space that is shared by various religious and secular 
traditions. This shared space does not so much rest on a specific type of 
                                                          
49 In a similar vein, Rawls distinguishes between public reason, which is the 
basis of political liberalism as a political conception and therefore has to be 
secular, and secular reason as an element of liberalism as a comprehensive 
doctrine. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism. Expanded Edition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 200. 
50 Adams, Habermas and Theology, p. 242; see also Ford, Christian 
Wisdom, p. 281.  
186          Peter Jonkers 
rationality, e.g., the procedural approach of Habermas and Rawls (see 
below), but is the result of the shared existential issues to which all 
religions and secular worldviews are trying to respond. In this context, it 
is also important to note that the fact that scriptural reasoning is aimed at 
a shared space by making the reasonings of religious and secular traditions 
public, does not mean that it strives after consensus, but rather after 
friendship, that is, the recognition of the sacred nature of each other’s 
scriptures and a shared desire to study them. 
As Adams has shown, scriptural reasoning offers a promising 
alternative to the views of Habermas and Rawls, two prominent 
philosophers who have studied the place of religions in democratic and, 
hence, pluralist societies.51 As noted above, all participants in scriptural 
reasoning acknowledge the sacredness of the others’ scriptures to them 
without necessarily acknowledging its authority for themselves. This 
dissociation of sacredness and authority is puzzling for Habermas as well 
as for Rawls; they stress, instead, that these two characteristics of religious 
scriptures are two sides of the same coin, and infer from this the 
intrinsically authoritarian and exclusivist character of religious traditions. 
Since this authoritarianism leaves, in their eyes, no room for tolerable 
disagreement, recognizing the sacred character of these scriptures is at 
odds with the liberal character of modern democracies. Therefore, 
religious insights have to be translated into a secular language 
(Habermas),52 or comply with the so-called proviso (Rawls), if non-
public, religious reason is to be introduced in the political sphere.53 
However, if religious traditions are required to make their deep reasonings 
public under the conditions of secular reason, they are not understood 
anymore in their own right, since they not only have to give up the 
authority, but also the sacredness of their scriptures. This is so because the 
sacredness of these texts precludes their translation in another, in 
particular secular, language just as, for similar reasons, a poem cannot 
simply be restated in other words. 
How, then, can scriptural reasoning realize the recognition of the 
sacred character of sacred scriptures, while avoiding that this recognition 
becomes exclusive? The answer is that it only coordinates discussions 
between members of different traditions without requiring a commitment 
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to a universal sphere that transcends those traditions, in particular, a 
commitment to secular reason. Participants engage in scriptural reasoning 
only as members of a particular tradition, and acknowledge no authority 
above that of their own tradition than the authority of God. But by doing 
so, they acknowledge that God is not circumscribed by their tradition, but 
is the non-circumscribable possibility of its very existence. “God is 
greater than language, greater than traditions, greater than scripture.”54 
The crucial difference between a secular, horizontal idea of transcendence 
(secular reason) and a religious, vertical one (God) is that the former can 
be claimed by a particular group, while the latter cannot. Hence, the 
people committed to religious traditions may be far more inclined to 
accept scriptural reasoning as the appropriate way to make their deep 
reasonings public than when they are required to fulfill the proviso or to 
translate them into the language of secular reason. 
Moreover, secular reason can only realize a neutral space to which 
anyone or no-one belongs. This corresponds to Rawls’ idea of public 
reason, which he defines as “the kind of reasons they [i.e., citizens] may 
reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at 
stake. I [i.e., Rawls] propose that in public reason comprehensive 
doctrines [religious, philosophical, and moral] of truth or right be replaced 
by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.”55 
By contrast, scriptural reasoning prepares a shared space, which means 
that the members of religious traditions accept the claim that the other 
belongs there without stating further conditions as to the nature of their 
reasonings. This explains why it is aimed at friendship, resulting from 
respectfully studying religious traditions, rather than at consensus on 
specific issues. 
A final reason why scriptural reasoning offers a promising 
alternative to the requirement to translate religious insights into secular 
rationality is that it does not make a strong contrast between 
argumentation and narrative. This approach is contrary to that of 
Habermas and Rawls, who focus on the argumentative value of non-
public, religious reason and neglect the narrative nature of sacred 
scriptures. Yet, because scriptural reasoning brings together the 
interpretation of sacred scriptures, the practices of philosophical and 
theological reasoning, and ‘public issue’ questions, there is argumentation 
at every stage of it. This is so because, again, scriptural reasoning is an 
expression of religious wisdom, which is a unity of faith and reason, and 
is practiced in a shared, not in a neutral, space. In other words, through its 
origin in religious wisdom, scriptural reasoning manifests a broader kind 
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of reasonableness than secular reason, and is therefore able to include 
argumentation and narration. 
In sum, “the crucial feature of scriptural reasoning […] is that it 
does not require participants to bracket or suspend or conceal their 
traditional identities for the purpose of conversation and 
argumentation,”56 as secular reason does. Instead, by making deep 
religious reasonings public, scriptural reasoning enables the participants 
to see the wisdom embedded in their own and others’ traditions. Ideally, 
this kind of reasoning can be used by the Church to bridge its disjunction 
with the seekers and their – often implicit – worldviews. It could 
encourage them to see the wisdom that is embedded in their own 
worldviews so that they don’t see them anymore as contingent social 
constructions. In comparison to the secular rationality proposed by 
Habermas and Rawls as a common, neutral ground, I am convinced that 
scriptural reasoning offers a far better way for discussing (religious and 
secular) ways of life in a radically pluralist society because it rests on a 




The leading question of this volume is how the Catholic Church, being in 
a minority position in most Western societies, can overcome its 
disjunction with the seekers and appeal again to society at large, and 
especially to the seekers. In this paper, I have tried to contribute to 
answering this question from a philosophical perspective. This means that 
the ‘how’ in the overcoming of this disjunction is discussed on a 
principled, not on an empirical, level. Furthermore, I tried to comply with 
one of Ricoeur’s working hypotheses, namely, to enter in a hermeneutical 
circle, which is required in order to interpret Christian faith from a 
philosophical perspective without reducing it to something that is at odds 
with its interpretation by the Christian community. To phrase it positively, 
my interpretation has been based on a deep sympathy with Christian faith, 
although, at the same time, I had to keep some distance from it, as is 
required by the philosophical character of my interpretation in contrast to 
a theological approach.  
The core of my answer is, first of all, that the paradoxical nature of 
the relation of the Church to the world, namely, of being in but not of the 
world, prevents it from wanting to overcome its existing disjunction with 
(the seekers in) contemporary society by identifying itself completely 
with it. Besides this fundamental theological reason, there is also an 
important philosophical reason for choosing a different approach: given 
the fact that so many people are caught in a predicament of being 
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convinced of the contingency of their ways of life and, at the same time, 
desperately looking for an authentic and truthful orientation, the Church 
should offer Christian wisdom as a way out of this situation. In the last 
sections of my paper, I have discussed several examples of Christian 
wisdom, but, of course, there are many more. However, in order to be 
effective, the Church should take into account that it is, and will remain 
for the foreseeable future, in a minority position in most Western 
societies, as well as that the latter are fundamentally marked by expressive 
individualism and radical pluralism. This means that it can by no means 
operate anymore from a position of power, as it used to do during the 
times of ultramontane mass Catholicism, but has to redefine itself in a 
kenotic way. Apart from the fact that, from a sociological perspective, 
there is no alternative for this new stance, it also is the best option for 
religious reasons: as long as the Church relied on its worldly power it was 
too worldly and was, thus, paradoxically, unable to truly open itself up to 
the world. Therefore, it should instead start with taking the predicament 
of today’s seekers radically serious and refrain from overwhelming them 
with fixed, pre-given answers. This opens a hermeneutical space for 
asking questions about existential truth, meaning, and hope. In this 
situation, the Church can offer its tradition of wisdom as an authentic and 
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